Archive for the ‘Darfur’ Category
CHAD. ‘Will Chad, a sometime client state of Muammar Gaddafi, find itself once again a target for al Qaeda?’ Update 3rd March 2013
Chad is one of a group of so called Sahel countries which include Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Mauritania having their northern Islamic provinces in the arid southern ‘shore’ of the Sahara. Their Christian and animist provinces lie in the richer, sub tropical regions. This split ethnicity and religiosity was manageable in French colonial times but is less so nowadays when the rise of militant Islamism threatens stability. Nigeria shares a similar problem stemming from the British colonial period.
In 2004 elements of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) entered Chad but were beaten off by Chadian forces. This group is now known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and was ejected by French forces in January 2013 from Gao and Timbuktu in Mali. Where will AQIM go next?
The English Cuckoo lays its egg in the nest of another species of bird which then proceeds to hatch the egg and raise the chick. Al Qaeda seeks out failed states and settles on them like cuckoos, imposing strict sharia law and creating terror and misery. Waziristan, Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, Northern Nigeria and Mali are hosting substantial numbers of these ferocious extremists. Small but active al Qaeda franchises exist in the Philippines and Indonesia. There are those who argue that al Qaeda may have established a franchise in Benghazi and Derna in Eastern Libya.
As the French and the British direct their attention to the possible knock on effect of the crisis in Mali this post asks the question ‘will Chad, a sometime client state of Muammar Gaddafi, find itself once again a target for al Qaeda?’
The factors which attract al Qaeda seem to be a weak or remote central government, a weak national army, a weak and corrupt police force, intertribal strife, a safe haven in remote and rough terrain, access to criminal enterprises such as smuggling and capturing foreigners for ransom, poverty, neglect and native Salafist sympathisers.
The fall of a military dictatorship followed by political instability offers it a perfect nest in which to lay its parasitical egg. Will the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, survive in power now that Gaddafi has gone must now be a crucial question. The Tebesti Mountains of northern Chad and Sothern Libya may be particularly tempting for hardcore al Qaeda fighters seeking remote badlands in which to hide and thrive.
In 1960 Chad gained independence from France after sixty years of colonial rule. It is a vast, landlocked and ethnically diverse country in which the French failed to promote a sense of national unity. That is no surprise because there are a number of national cultures and religious affiliations, some of which have their roots in pre-colonial days. It follows that since independence Chad has suffered from deep religious and ethnic divisions. The struggle for power amongst the elites resulted in periods of armed rebellion and destructive civil war in which the meddlesome role of Gaddafi was notable.
In Chad there is the constant danger that the divide between the Arabised ‘Islamic’ north and the ‘Christian’ south will result in polarisation between the two, this inhibiting the formation of a democratic government and the sharing of resources. The government of Chad, which is formed from members of the northern and eastern Islamic groups, is becoming more Islamist in orientation. Chad, thus far, is a secular state, but the strengthening of Islam in public life and the friction between the faiths will threaten long term stability.
In Chad the use of armed force has been the means of establishing power. The current president, Idriss Déby, came to power by force of arms in 1990 and has since held on with the support of the national army which numbers around thirty thousand men. There is also Déby’s elite Republican Guard which is under his personal control and numbers around 5,500 personal. President Déby’s greatest external ally, France, maintains a military base there also. This last may be a lone guarantee of stability for Déby as things stand in the Sahel today.
AL Qaeda will have noted that the Tebesti region, bordering on Libya, is still an insecure area made the more unsafe by the large number of land mines laid by the Libyans when they occupied the Aozou Strip from 1973 to 1994. Chad has a unique position as it bridges sub Saharan and North Africa and also east and west Sahel. It also has long boarders with Sudan’s unstable and remote Darfur province and in the south with the troubled Central African Republic. Another hostage to fortune for Chad lurks in the north where its border with Libya lies somewhere within the Aozou Strip the ownership of which the two countries disputed violently between 1973 and 1994.
Muammar Gaddafi reigned in Libya for more that forty years during which he meddled too often in the affairs of his southern neighbour Chad. Gaddafi and President Idriss Déby of Chad were particularly close, a relationship with inevitable consequences for the future of the two countries. France has been Idriss Déby’s main source of external support during his twenty years reign but Libya was ally number two, financially and politically.
Libya has enough to do to establish a democratic government and recover from its recent civil war. The northern regions of Chad, previously totally dependent on trade with Libya, will take time to re-establish relations with a neighbour troubled by intertribal strife and lack of border control. Relations with Libya are made the more difficult because a large number of Chadians accused of being Gaddafi’s mercenaries remain incarcerated in jails maintained by Libya militias. There are persistent rumours that they are being tortured.
The instability which followed Gaddafi’s summary execution in his home town of Sirte on 29th October 2011 has affected the nations of the Sahel and catalysed the Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali followed by the disastrous rise of an al Qaeda franchise. This undesirable outcome threatened the stability of not only Mali but also neighbouring Niger, the source of yellow cake uranium which supplies French nuclear power stations. If the domino effect is valid Chad, France’s other ex-colonial ally in the Sahel, was in line for an al Qaeda takeover bid. France was, therefore, forced to intervene when the al Qaeda become overconfident and threatened the Mali government in Bamako.
The mobility of the al Qaeda leadership can be in no doubt. The bad lands of the deep Sahara have long been traversed by the Tuareg and the Tebu, people for whom the artificial borders resulting from old colonial acquisitions have little meaning. They are able to traverse great arid regions which they know as well London Taxi drivers their own perplexing city. They share this talent with a number of Bedouin tribes who have traded across the Sahara from time immemorial. Thus it is possible for the al Qaeda franchises and the smuggling and the criminal bands to vanish into inhospitable and inaccessible country only reappear elsewhere to cause trouble. Rebellion and criminality is thus likely to pop up at any place in this vast arena to destabilise fragile economies and make refugees of hordes of people.
The French may dread the possibility of a successful coup against the Déby regime precipitated by the fall of Gaddafi and the instability in the Sahel region. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb must anticipate the possibility with increasing confidence.
Update 2nd March 2013
Al Qaeda leader probably killed by Chadian forces
Update 3rd March 2013
More on the possible killing of an al Qaeda leader by Chadian forces:
DARFUR – ANOTHER POTENTIAL FLASH POINT IN THE SAHEL (A post in an occasional series about Gaddafi’s African Legacy.)
The unforeseen consequences of the Libya civil war in Mali and Algeria are dominating the news in the UK and France. There are other consequences which need attention in the remote Sudanese province of Darfur. Reuters is reporting that some 30,000 people have fled their homes in Golo and Guldo towns to escape two weeks of fighting that began on December 24 in Darfur’s Jebel Marra area. Also around 2,800 people fled to a camp in Nertiti in central Darfur, already home to 42,000 displaced people.
There are unconfirmed reports that rebels from the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) faction led by Abdel Wahed Mohamed al-Nur have seized the towns of Golo and Rockero. Several thousand people are reported to have fled when fighting broke out between two Arab tribes over the use of a gold mine in the Jebel Amer area of North Darfur.
Darfur is in one of the poorest regions of Sudan. It is hard to reach because it is so far from the capital, Khartoum. It has long been neglected by the central government. Conditions there are ripe for exploitation by malign elements. There is a classic feedback loop. Neglect increases dissatisfaction with governments. Dissatisfaction leads to conflict which attracts radical groups such as the al Qaeda franchises.
Libya has long been interested in Darfur. 1985 Gaddafi concluded a military agreement with the Sudanese government to supply trucks and spares for Soviet equipment already on the Sudanese military inventory in exchange for being allowed to set up a base in Darfur for Libyan forces engaged in a war with Chad. Since then Gaddafi was been credited with meddling in Sudanese affairs, especially in Darfur.
The dreadful depravations of the notorious Janjaweed militias in Darfur between 1985 and 1990 may have been one of the unforeseen consequences of Gaddafi’s foreign policy in the region. By the time this conflict was resolved and estimated 5,400 had been killed, tens of thousands had been displaced and 40,000 homes destroyed.
Libya’s neighbours, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali and Algeria, have been forced to adjust themselves to the fluid and dangerous situation caused by Gaddafi’s fall. It will be useful to look further into the wider effect.
Update 7th June 2016
Darfur flooded with arms:
There are numerous analyses of the current problems in Mali. I have argued elsewhere that one of the unforeseen consequences of the civil war in Libya was to catalyse the Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali and that al Qaeda franchises muscled in on the act to assume control. My piece in this blog called ‘The Libyan Civil War – Some Consequences for Children’ was, in fact, a draft paper for the ‘War Child Journal’ and was written with a narrow focus – that of bringing the plight of children in the Sahel to a wider readership.
Amongst that interesting blogs on the subject of Mali is ‘Crossed Crocodiles’ and I suggest that the following might be interesting reading:
Whatever we might think about the underlying cause, some are predicting a ‘Somalia’ in the Sahel.
I am aware that there are numerous differences between Mali and Somalia. It is facile to compare the two but I would respectfully draw attention to the UNHCR data on Somalia and Mali.
There are an estimated 1,022,856 refugees from the long running problems, largely caused by the Al Qaeda franchise Al Shabaab, in Somalia. So far the UNHCR estimate that there are 211,645 refugees who have fled the crisis in Mali which is but a few months old. The possibility of it spreading to Algeria, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and more is a nightmare we must all share.
For data on refugees from Somalia read:
….and from northern Mali:
Update 9th January 2013
This is worth following up
Update 11th January 2013
France enters the fray;
Update 13th January 2013
A useful guide to Mali’s armed groups:
Update 14th January 2013
Some good words on why France intervened:
Update 17th January 2013
Some background to the attack on the BP gas facility in Algeria carried out by an al Qaeda franchise – apparently because of the French intervention in Mali.
Update 18th December 2013
Some interesting comments about the BP gas facility. Did the terrorists enter Algeria from Libya?
Update 23rd January 2013
A balanced piece on the nature of the al Qaeda in Mali, the French intervention and the UK Prime Minister’s assertions about the threat as a whole.
……and the confusion about where the terrorists came from continues:
Update 27th January 2013
This is a very well researched piece about crime and al Qaeda in Mali and its neighbours\:
Update 1st February 2013
This report from Mali should be read widely.
Update 11th February 2013
Reports of an al Qaeda training camp in Mali
Update 14th February 2013
The al Qaeda ‘cuckoo’ caught in the process of laying its egg in the Tuareg nest. The plan to take over in Mali revealed:
Update 2nd March 2013
Al Qaeda leader probably killed by Chadian forces in Mali
Update 3rd March 2013
More on the possible killing of the al Qaeda leader by Chadian forces
Update 3rd May 2013
Interesting news about drug smuggling routes and al Qaeda.
Update 21st June 2013
Latest developments in Mali discussed by experts in this al Jazeera piece.